

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.L.W.B., JR., A	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR	:	PENNSYLVANIA
	:	
	:	
APPEAL OF: V.H., MOTHER	:	
	:	
	:	
	:	
	:	No. 930 MDA 2026

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 21, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 3-AD-2026

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:

FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2026

Appellant, V.H. ("Mother"), appeals from the decree entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans' Court, which involuntarily terminated her parental rights to Q.L.W.B., Jr. ("Child") (born in February 2016). We affirm.

In its opinion, the Orphans' Court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows:

Child was born [in] February...2016. On October 23, 2020, the Agency received a referral with concerns for substance abuse by Mother, who tested positive for phencyclidine and marijuana. Mother agreed for Child to reside with maternal aunt under a safety plan. On May 7, 2021, maternal aunt was granted sole custody of Child, and on May 25, 2021, the Agency closed the family for services.

The instant case was initiated on January 20, 2022, when the Agency filed a Dependency Petition due to continued substance abuse by Mother, as she had tested positive for phencyclidine upon the birth of Child's sibling. On January

24, 2022, following a shelter care hearing, Mother was granted shared custody of her children with maternal aunt, who had presented as a resource. This [c]ourt found that Child was not dependent and released him to the custody of maternal aunt. The [c]ourt, however, ordered that Child's sibling remain in the care and custody of the Agency, pending an adjudication and disposition ("A&D") hearing.

From January of 2022 to January 4, 2024, Mother had continuous involvement with the Agency regarding Child's sibling.

On August 9, 2024, the Agency received a referral with concerns for Mother, Child, and Child's sibling. The referral source indicated that Mother was intoxicated and hit Child's sibling.

On August 10, 2024, an Agency caseworker attempted to call Child's maternal aunt at various telephone numbers but was unable to reach her. The caseworker also attempted to visit Mother's home but [was] unable to reach anyone there. Later that day, Mother called the caseworker and stated that she felt like the Agency was harassing her and that she intended to get an attorney. The caseworker told Mother that she needed to see the children, but Mother told the caseworker that she was not in the area. Also, later that day, the Agency caseworker received a text ... stating that maternal aunt had custody of Child and that Child's sibling was with Mother but was to return to Milton Hershey School within the week.

On August 11, 2024, the Agency caseworker completed an announced home visit. Mother denied any allegations of hitting Child's sibling. Mother admitted that she drinks beer sometimes. Mother denied any drug use at that time, but she was asked to submit to a drug screen, which was positive for PCP and alcohol.

On August 14, 2024, there was a safety plan hearing for Child and his sibling, and the [c]ourt accepted a sixty (60)-day plan for the children. However, on August 16, 2024, Mother called the caseworker and stated that the children's safety plan resource was no longer able to care for the children. Consequently, on the same day, the Agency held

a family meeting, it was determined that since Child did not have a resource, he would be placed into foster care.

On August 19, 2024, the Agency filed a second Dependency Petition due to ongoing concerns regarding Mother's substance abuse and lack of parental ability for Child. On August 26, 2024, following a shelter care hearing, this [c]ourt ordered that Child remain in the temporary custody of the Agency pending an A&D hearing.

On September 4, 2024, an A&D hearing was held, and this [c]ourt ordered Child and his sibling to be adjudicated dependent and placed in the care and custody of the Agency. Mother attended this hearing. On September 9, 2024, Dauphin County Drug and Alcohol Evaluation recommended inpatient treatment for Mother, and on September 11, 2024, a county mobile case management specialist informed the Agency caseworker that she recommended Mother to participate in outpatient counseling services for drug and alcohol treatment.

On October 8, 2024, Mother completed a psychological evaluation with Hugh Smith & Associates, and Mother was diagnosed with Bipolar 1 Disorder, Phencyclidine Use Disorder, and Intellectual Disability.

On November 1, 2024, Mother began working with Justice Works Nurture Parenting Program, a program which she ultimately completed on March 12, 2025. In December 2024, Mother began outpatient drug and alcohol treatment through PA Counseling, but on March 21, 2025, she was unsuccessfully discharged from this treatment due to lack of attendance.

On January 27, 2025, while at the Agency's office to meet with her new caseworker, Mother tested positive for PCP, although she denied any drug use and requested monthly meetings to discuss what she needed to do.

On February 19, 2025, Mother called the caseworker and said she could not work because she had heart failure and that she was running out of money to pay bills. On April 3, 2025, the caseworker completed an announced home visit and did a walkthrough at the home. The caseworker

observed that the house was safe and appropriate, but during the visit, Mother expressed multiple times that she was still struggling with finances.

On May 26, 2025, Mother had a video visit with Child, but the call ended early because Child wanted to go play video games. On June 26, 2025, Child's foster mother expressed concerns about possible inappropriate discipline from family members. On June 27, 2025, Mother completed a drug screen but cancelled her scheduled visit with Child because she had to visit another one of her children in the hospital.

On July 21, 2025, the Agency received an email from Child's foster mother indicating that Child did not want to visit Mother that week. At the same time, Mother completed an intake at PA Counseling for dual program of drug and alcohol and mental health.

On August 21, 2025, following a permanency review hearing, this [c]ourt ordered Child to remain dependent and in the care and custody of the Agency. The [c]ourt also ordered Mother and Child to complete family therapy. Additionally, it was ordered that visitation between Mother and Child could only increase if there were negative drug screens for six (6) consecutive Mondays. On the same day as the permanency review hearing, the Agency met with Mother to discuss the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) timeline. The Agency discussed family therapy and service objectives as well as the plan for Child to come home. Mother purportedly stated that she could obtain financial assistance but said that she did not want to go through the process of doing so.

On August 22, 2025, Mother cancelled a supervised visit with Child. On August 31, 2025, the Agency attempted a home visit with Mother but was unable to reach her despite knocking multiple times on the door and repeated attempts to call her on the telephone.

On September 2, 2025, the Agency spoke with Mother via telephone regarding inadequate drug screening paperwork from third parties. Mother reportedly began yelling and made a comment about giving up on getting Child back. On the same date, the Agency conducted an unannounced

home visit, but the Agency representative had to wait and knock for ten (10) minutes before Mother opened the door.

On September 12, 2025, Mother met with the Agency at the Agency's office, where Mother expressed that she did not want to participate in family therapy despite it being ordered by this [c]ourt.

On September 19, 2025, Mother cancelled a supervised visit with Child. On September 26, 2025, Mother tested positive for alcohol in a drug screen, and another supervised visit with Child was cancelled.

On October 23, 2025, the Agency visited Child's foster home. While there, Child told the Agency that Mother had spent the whole weekend with him while he was at his aunt's house, and Mother had told him not to say anything about her being there. The same day, Child's foster mother reached out to the Agency and said that Mother had called asking if the Agency had been out to see Child. Reportedly, when Child was told that he would no longer be able to see his aunt, he was visibly excited.

On October 29, 2025, Mother called the Agency and stated that she would not come in for her scheduled drug screen. She also refused to provide information about whether she had stayed overnight with Child. On October 30, 2025, the Agency was informed by Child's therapist that Child was scared to go home to Mother.

On November 20, 2025, this [c]ourt held a permanency review hearing and ordered that Child remain dependent and in the care and custody of the Agency. This [c]ourt also ordered that Mother's visits be reduced to twice a month.

On February 4, 2026, the Agency filed a Petition for Involuntary Termination of Mother's parental rights to Child.

(Orphans' Court Opinion, filed 7/30/26, at 1-6).

The court held a termination hearing on March 16, 2026 and May 19, 2026. At the March 16, 2026 hearing, the court heard testimony from the

following witnesses: Angela Weller, Psy. D., a psychologist who conducted a psychological and parenting evaluation of Mother on October 8, 2024; Mikayla O'Reilly, an outpatient therapist at Pennsylvania Counseling Service, who worked as Mother's therapist; Elizabeth Staub, Mother's caseworker from the Agency;¹ Chanell Blanding (Mother's cousin); Mother; and T.H. (Child's adult sibling who resides with Mother).

At the May 19, 2026 hearing, the court heard additional testimony from Ms. Staub and testimony from Child's foster father. The court also conducted an *in camera* interview with Child. Child expressed a preference to live with Mother.²

On May 21, 2026, the court entered a decree involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal on June 11, 2026, along with a concise statement per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

Did the [Orphans' Court] abuse its discretion in terminating

¹ Ms. Staub testified, *inter alia*, that "after approximately two years of Agency involvement with Child, Mother has still not completed the following service objectives: 1) weekly communication with Child either through visits, phone calls, or text messages; 2) following through with any recommendation from her drug and alcohol evaluation; and 3) completing three weekly drug screenings." (Orphans' Court Opinion at 12) (citing N.T. Hearing, 3/16/26, at 54-55).

² We note that the record confirms the court appointed separate legal interests counsel for Child following the conclusion of the March 16, 2026 hearing when the record indicated that there might be a conflict between Child's best and legal interests. (**See** N.T. Hearing, 3/16/26, at 158-59). We further note with displeasure that legal interests counsel did not file a brief on appeal.

parental rights of Mother where the agency failed to meet its burden of proof? ...

Did the [Orphans' Court] abuse its discretion by failing to give primary consideration to the developmental, physical, emotional needs, and welfare of the child?

(Mother's Brief at 5) (sub-issues omitted).

Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the following principles:

In cases involving termination of parental rights: "our standard of review is limited to determining whether the order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child."

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting ***In re I.J.***, 972 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. ... We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (*en banc*), *appeal denied*, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) (internal citations omitted).

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for doing so.

In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The

standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. ***In re J.D.W.M.***, 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for the result reached. ***In re C.S.***, 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (*en banc*). If the court's findings are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the court's decision, even if the record could support an opposite result. ***In re R.L.T.M.***, 860 A.2d 190, 191[-92] (Pa.Super. 2004).

In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting ***In re Adoption of K.J.***, 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), *appeal denied*, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008)).

The Orphans' Court granted involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which state:³

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

- (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

³ Although the court also found termination proper under Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), "[p]arental rights may be involuntarily terminated where any **one** subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions." ***In re Z.P., supra*** at 1117 (emphasis added). Thus, we focus our review on Section 2511(a)(1) and (b). For this reason, we also omit below Mother's arguments as to whether termination was proper under Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8).

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).

In her issues combined, Mother argues that throughout the proceedings she has shown a constant resolve to complete her service objectives. Mother highlights testimony from Ms. Staub that Mother signed all releases, completed parenting classes, completed a psychological evaluation, followed through with a drug and alcohol evaluation, and maintained consistent communication with the Agency. Mother emphasizes that she obtained a living space that is safe and appropriate for Child where Child's siblings can also reside. Mother acknowledges that she missed 14 visits with Child within a period of two years, but she explains there "was a mix of the Agency not allowing her to visit if she tested positive for narcotics, the Child not wanting to go, or cancellations." (Mother's Brief at 12). Mother insists that she attempted to engage with Child even when Child did not want to attend visits. Mother contends that she maintained a showing of interest in Child's life. Mother insists that her hard work and progress make clear that she did not

demonstrate a settled purpose to relinquish a parental claim to Child, or a refusal or inability to perform parental duties per Section 2511(a)(1).

Regarding Section 2511(b), Mother argues that she has a beneficial bond with Child. Mother contends that her visits with Child generally went well and Child would be happy to see her. Mother avers that she encouraged Child to maintain proper hygiene and keep up with treating his skin conditions (dry skin/eczema). Mother highlights that she would embrace Child, show him photos of the family on her phone, play basketball with him, eat with him, and try to call Child on the phone even when Child did not want to speak to her. Mother insists that she has all of Child's favorite things at her home and she will ensure Child can play sports and do all the things he enjoys. Mother maintains that the Agency did not present evidence of a lack of a bond between Mother and Child. Mother asserts that severing the bond between Mother and Child will be harmful to Child. Mother concludes that the court's termination decision under Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) was improper, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

When conducting a termination analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of...his parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:

To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent's explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination will meet the child's needs and welfare. ***In re C.P.***, 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa.Super. 2006). "Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond."

Id. Significantly:

In this context, the court must take into account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

Further, our Supreme Court has clarified that, in making a Section 2511(b) determination, a trial court must analyze: (1) whether the parental bond is “necessary and beneficial to the child;” (2) “the child’s need for permanency and length of time in foster care;” (3) “whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents;” and (4) “whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety and stability.”

Interest of K.T., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (2023). Moreover, the Court explained that, when reviewing the nature of the parental bond, a court must consider “whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” **Id.**

Instantly, the Orphans’ Court explained its rationale for terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) as follows:

[T]he testimony presented at the [termination h]earing in this matter demonstrated that Mother had evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to Child for a

period of at least six months immediately preceding the Agency's filing of the [termination p]etition.

While Mother has complied with some of the service objectives established in this case, that compliance overall has been minimal. Mother took one parenting course, she maintained contact with the Agency, and she attended all permanency review hearings. However, her efforts to improve her mental health and address her substance addiction have been inconsistent, and the results of such efforts have been mixed.

While Mother completed a psychological evaluation, she did not complete all the recommendations of the evaluation as of the time of the [termination] hearing. Specifically, she had not yet commenced mental health counseling, she had not set up a psychiatric consultation, and she had not arranged family therapy as recommended by the evaluation. Moreover, while she was participating in drug and alcohol treatment as of the time of the [termination] hearing, the testimony established that her attendance at the treatment sessions was sporadic, with her having missed six of her scheduled counseling sessions in the month of February 2026 alone. Moreover, while both the Agency and PA Counseling required Mother to submit to periodic drug screenings, Mother consistently has missed drug screenings and has tested positive for alcohol on multiple occasions, causing her to miss scheduled visits with Child. In fact, throughout the life of this case, [Ms.] Staub reported that Mother has missed about fourteen (14) scheduled visits with Child, either due to positive drug screens or last-minute cancellations by Mother. Mother herself admitted that she drinks alcohol on occasion despite the fact that she recently met the criteria for alcohol abuse and in spite of her past significant struggles with PCP addiction.

In sum, while we acknowledge that Mother has seemingly made progress regarding her PCP addiction, her continued use of alcohol, her sporadic attendance at drug and alcohol treatment sessions, her repeated failure to submit to periodic drug testing, are concerning in light of her previous substance addiction and raises concerns about her ability to be serious about and effectively treat and manage her substance use. As improving her mental health and getting

her substance abuse fully under control are pivotal to ensuring Mother's ability to effectively parent and provide a safe and stable environment for Child, we believe that her overall inconsistent and lackluster efforts in these endeavors evidence a settled purpose of relinquishing claim to Child, and the termination of her parental rights was appropriate under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

(Orphans' Court Opinion at 20-22).

The record supports the court's analysis. Although Mother made some progress throughout the life of this case, Mother failed to complete or follow through with multiple recommendations as discussed above. Indeed, Dr. Weller testified that after she evaluated Mother, she provided various recommendations to Mother in a letter which directed Mother to reach out to Dr. Weller to discuss the recommendations in more detail. However, Dr. Weller had no record of Mother following up with Dr. Weller. (**See** N.T. Hearing, 3/16/26, at 12-13). Mother's therapist, Ms. O'Reilly, also testified that Mother had several no-show or cancelled treatment appointments. (**See id.** at 28-29). Caseworker Staub also confirmed that Mother's compliance with her service objectives was mixed. (**Id.** at 41-49). Further, as discussed, Mother missed approximately 14 visits with Child either due to cancellations by Mother or due to positive drug screens by Mother which caused her to be unable to attend. (**Id.** at 42). While Ms. Staub also sought to help Mother set up case management services, Mother expressed disinterest in certain services. (**Id.** at 45). Mother also failed to appear for multiple scheduled drug screenings and missed several scheduled counseling sessions. (**Id.** at 47-48).

Ms. Staub also testified that Mother has not attended Child's regular medical appointments or any of Child's sports practices or games. (*Id.* at 52-53). Ms. Staub explained that after approximately two years of Agency involvement, Mother had still failed to complete all of her service objectives. (*Id.* at 54-55). On this record, we cannot say that the court erred or abused its discretion in finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was proper under Section 2511(a)(1). ***In re Z.P., supra; In re Z.S.W., supra.***

With respect to Section 2511(b), the Orphans' Court stated:

In the instant case, the best interests of Child were served by terminating Mother's parental rights and ordering that Child remain in the custody of the Agency. Child reported to this [c]ourt that he loved his Mother and wanted to stay with his Mother, but the evidence and testimony presented over the two-day hearing raised significant doubts to this [c]ourt about whether being placed with Mother would provide the security and stability necessary to promote Child's developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare.

While Child claimed that he loved his mother and that he wished to live with her, this [c]ourt is not convinced that is such a strong bond between Child and Mother that severing the bond would be detrimental to Child's wellbeing. Caseworker Staub, who observed visits between Mother and Child throughout the life of this case, reported that Child would be hesitant to react with Mother during the visits, and Child would often play on his phone or play sports alone in the Agency's visitation room. Moreover, it was reported that as this case progressed, Child refused to even answer the phone when Mother attempted to call.

As for Child's developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare, we do not believe that these would be best served by continuing Mother's parental rights and placing Child with Mother. Child's newest foster father testified that Child has been exhibiting significant behavioral issues in the

days leading up to the second [termination] hearing date, and Caseworker Staub unequivocally testified that Child would best benefit from having stability, discipline, and responsibility which he clearly lacked in Mother's home. Mother's ongoing issues with alcohol abuse, her hesitance to seek mental health treatment, and her inconsistent efforts at keeping up with drug and alcohol treatment clearly pose a challenge to her ability to tend to Child's developmental, physical and emotional needs, a challenge which is compounded by the fact that Mother is unable to drive and, by her own admission, would have to heavily rely on other individuals to assist in the transportation and caregiving of Child.

Taking all the foregoing into consideration, we believe that terminating Mother's parental rights will not be detrimental to Child's emotional wellbeing, and we maintain that terminating Mother's parental rights and permitting the Agency to work towards placing Child in a permanent stable foster home would be the most conducive to promoting Child's developmental, physical and emotional needs.

(Orphans' Court Opinion at 26-27).


The record supports the court's analysis. Caseworker Staub testified that when she observed some visits between Mother and Child, Child would sit on his phone or play basketball alone. (**See** N.T. Hearing, 3/16/26, at 43-44). Ms. Staub noted that between the dates of the termination hearings, Child had been placed in a new foster home. Ms. Staub testified that between the dates of the termination hearings, Mother had missed two of her scheduled visits with Child and had multiple positive screens for alcohol. Based on the developments between the March 16, 2026 and May 19, 2026 hearing dates, Ms. Staub opined that it was still her belief that it would be in Child's best interests to have Mother's parental rights terminated. (**See** N.T. Hearing,

5/19/26, at 5-8). Further, Child's foster father at the time of the second termination hearing stated that despite Child's recent behavior, he was still willing to serve as a foster parent for Child and was trying to effectively deal with Child's outbursts. (**See id.** at 16-21).

Although the court acknowledged Child's preference to live with Mother, such preference is not dispositive. **See Interest of D.R.-W.**, 227 A.3d 95 (Pa.Super. 2020) (explaining that child's preferred outcome in termination matter is not controlling, especially where child is under 12 years old; where child's preference appeared immature and completely at odds with other evidence of record, it was well within court's discretion to accord such preference little weight). On this record, we cannot say that the court erred or abused its discretion in deciding that termination of Mother's parental rights was proper under Section 2511(b), where termination would best serve Child's needs and welfare. **See In re Z.P., supra.** Accordingly, we affirm.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Benjamin D. Kohler", is written over a horizontal line.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/23/2026